I said I would write more about the Ancient Borderlands Conference, and so, here is a discussion on a paper that was particularly interesting to me: Roman Grain Supply 442-445, by Jason Linn of UCSB.
Before I address the argument contained in this paper, I must backtrack a bit, and tell the history of the Vandals. The Vandals are an interesting group of people. In a lecture, Ian Wood called them a 'band of refugees'. And it does seem like this is the case: among the Vandals, we find, Suebi, 'Vandals' (two different groups, the Hasdingi and the Siling), Alans, Sarmatians, Alamanni, Franks, Herulii; all manners of peoples that dwelled in the Austro-Hungarian steppes and along the Rhine banks. The amalgam of peoples began when, pressured by the Huns, they moved to the banks of the Rhine, and broke the Rhine defenses in 402/03 and made their way to Spain. There they settled, until they crossed to Africa in 429, and in 439, they made a treaty with the Romans recognizing their territory in North Africa.
Why is this relevant? A grain fleet from North Africa and Egypt, called the Annona, sailed from Carthage and Alexandria to approvision Rome with basic cereals. With Carthage falling under Vandal jurisdiction, this could pose a problem, as Rome might be missing key supplies, thus potentially leading to starvation. The Vandals initially cooperate and maintain the annona until 442, when in another treaty with the Romans, they reduced the amount of the grain that they would ship, and managed to keep 7/8th of the tax revenues provided by the African provinces of Numidia and Mauretania Sitifensis.
With the loss of this bread-basket, what was the ultimate result on the population of Rome? Jason Linn argues that the result was not so great. The strongest part of his argument is undoubtedly the reaction of the emperor Valentinian III: he did not react; at least not with regards to Rome (he did pass a few laws helping out African refugees in exile). No evidence or rationing in Rome, no evidence of any law that sought to divert other grain supplies to the city of Rome. It is indeed hard to imagine that an emperor would let Rome starve without lifting so much as his little finger. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Romans ever rose up against the lack of grain; which was not the case when there were other grain or food shortages under the second triumvirate and later when Alaric besieged Rome (a Roman lady opened the door to the Visigoths to alleviate the hunger).
In the response by Professor Humphreys criticized Jason's use of numbers. Jason Linn used a numerical study to show that the effect of the loss of the annona did not affect the army, which had been reduced in number, and thus was not as dependent on imported grain for supplies. Professor Humphreys' criticism focused on the 'minimalistic' choice of Jason's assessment of the late-Roman army. The size of the Roman army, Humphreys argues (quite rightly I think), is more relevant of which school of thought one ascribes to (minimalist vs. maximalist).
Where I think Jason is absolutely right is in saying that the loss of the north-African annona had little effects on Rome itself. The reasons to me are (aside from the ones stated above) manifolds, and three strike me as important: 1) the political situation in the provinces dependent on the western emperor had shrunk tremendously; 2) the Egyptian annona maintained grain supplies to Rome until the mid-fifth century; and 3) the size of the Roman population did not necessitate a large grain supply.
For points 2, and 3- see Michael McCormick, The Origins of European Economy.
The Political Situation in the Western Roman Empire.
When Peter Brown first set forth his arguments for change and continuity of classical culture into Late Antiquity, he thought that the arguments for Decline and Fall focused almost entirely on the western world, whereas the Roman Empire was a larger territory that included the Greek east and Egypt. It seems that we have gone full circle and now focus almost entirely on the Mediterranean at the expense of Gaul, Britain and Spain.
If there were one major political trend in Late Antique Gaul and Britain, it would be fragmentation. In 410, Britain was left to fend for itself against invading Saxons and Picts, when the usurper Constantine III moved his troops from Britain and into Gaul (his rebellion ends with his surrender in 411). In other words, Rome did not have to worry about supplying the British troops any longer.
Constantine III's defeat at the hands of the general Flavius Constantius is also telling of the state of affairs in Late Roman Gaul, militarily speaking. First, Constantine's general Gerontius had proclaimed his own candidate Maximus to become emperor. This volte-face allowed forced Constantine III to seek help from the Franks and the Alamanni as auxiliary fighters in what Peter Heather dubs a 'relief army'. This shows one of two possibilities: either Constantine's army had been exhausted by the three-year conflict, OR Flavius Constantius's Italian army was significantly larger than his. Both explanation are possible and not mutually exclusive.
At any rates, that Constantine used barbarians to fight is part of a larger trend in late Roman military. When the eastern army was 'destroyed' (the extent of the destruction is debatable) by the Goths at Adrianople in 376, the Roman emperor Theodosius used 'federate' Goths to fill in the holes. Later, when the Roman general Aetius faced Attila at the battle of the Catalaunian fields, present with him were Visigoths, Franks, and Burgundians.
With Britain out the way, one can wonder what happened in Gaul. There, political fragmentation also ensued. The pressing need for local leadership led local 'bandits' to rise up. By the time the Vandals made their treaty limiting the supply provided by the annona, Gaul resembled a gigantic jigsaw puzzle. The Bagaudae had revolted and taken control of Armorica, the Visigoths were settled around Toulouse and slowly moving into Spain, the Burgundians were slowly expanding in the Jura, and the Franks were moving down into northern Gaul, an area Ian Wood described as a power vacuum.
Dwindling territories also mean dwindling political and dwindling need for military supplies. As Ray Van Dam argued, problems of rebellions can best be seen in light of the large dismantling of leadership at the local level. Imperial ability to respond to local crises is evident, and this would tend to show that by 442, the Italian government did not have to worry about the supply of a large army. In other words, I feel that Jason is absolutely correct in his assessment of the end of the annona in 442, except that it shows an increasing fragmentation of the Mediterranean.
Some ideas: What are the areas of interests for Valentinian III? What areas did his laws touch? What are their overarching themes?
In conclusion, thanks Jason for getting to me think about these problems.
see also:
Peter Heather- The Fall of the Roman Empire- Good overview, easy read
Michael Kulikowski- Rome's Gothic Wars- shorter, more concise read
Michael McCormick- The Origins of European Economy
Ray Van Dam- Leadership and Community in Late Antique Gaul- less of a reference book than Heather or McCormick.
