Susan Reynolds’ work Kingdoms and Communities is a study of the various communal[1] ties that made medieval society a coherent whole. Indeed, in her introduction, she states that there was much greater interregional coherence in communal processes during the medieval period.[2] The corollary here is that, in spite of the criticism by various scholars, we can, in fact, speak of a coherent Medieval Europe.[3] One such process is that division or conflicts fosters bonds, not only at the local level, but also at the level of the realm. This response investigates this claim with the evidence provided by the investiture controversy.[4] Clearly, two polities are at work, Rome and the Holy Roman Empire, with a third group of polities, perhaps the most important, Italian cities.
In chapter 6 of her book, Susan Reynolds argues that the way towns grew was not primarily an economic necessity. This revolutionary argument brings to historical discourses, what was present in archaeology, that is, that there is no dual purpose (one military, the other economic) to towns. Rather, large settled, and most importantly fortified areas, became the foci for many communal activities, ranging from assemblies of magnates, to some primarily local trade.[5] The large markets, though, appear as a consequence of the size of these settlements, and were not a cause of urbanization.[6] Then, the main reason for urbanization is political. So too the bonds that tied together a community were, at least initially, political.[7]
Then, it becomes necessary to consider the creation of the towns in the context of political dynamics. Indeed, the towns were still part of a system, and were often dependent on a patron. Lübeck is one example, where the emperor is plays a major role. Indeed, the emperor guarantees not only the existence of privileges, but also that the privileges are to be enforced. In addition, the emperor is also able to grant privileges that extend beyond the city itself, that is “that the people of Lübeck should enjoy the right and conditions that the people of Cologne, Tiel […] and their members enjoy” (Lübeck is made an Imperial City, Class handout, p.50). The example of Laon provides another example: the bishop’s approval was necessary, even from a simply legal standpoint, for the privileges to be granted. Guillaume of Nogent states that after the oaths of association were broken, the people “such rage, such amazement seized the burghers that all the craftsmen abandoned their jobs and the stalls of the tanners and cobblers were closed […] ” (The Formation of the Commune at Laon, Handout, p.39). Two conclusions arise. First, the role of the lord or patron is still crucial for the existence of the commune, and second, crisis creates ties within these urban communities. Indeed, what in common would the tanners, cobblers, innkeepers and chapman have in common that they all decided to strike? Then cohesion is made at the local level in the context of crisis.
There is little doubt that the investiture contest polarized the constituencies involved, both at the local level and the level of the realm.[8] One letter of Gregory to Otto, bishop of Constance, from 1074, provides an interesting example of the way the contest divided loyalties, and by extension communities. Indeed, Gregory writes to Otto in order that Otto would enforce Gregory’s legislation on the priesthood. Otto’s actions show that, at least initially, he must have aligned himself with the emperor: “A report has come to us [royal we, refers to Gregory] with regard to Your Fraternity, which I have heard with grief and regret […]. Wherefore we command you to present yourself before us […] to give answer […] for this disobedience and contempt of the Apostolic See” (Tierney, p.48-49). It appears, then, that there were different loyalties at play that were more important that loyalty to the ecclesia catholica. It is worth noting also that, in the letter, it is not just the bishop who is in canonical wrong, but his community of priests. Indeed, Otto “presides over the numerous clergy and the widespread population,” chose not to punish “those who had taken concubines persisted in their crime, while those who had not yet done so had no fear of your prohibitions” (Tierney, p.50). In other words, the conflict does not involve just the bishop, but his whole community.
Finally, the Concordat of Worms (Sept 1122) can be seen as a compromise, much in the same light as the Magna Carta: it is a piece of collective activity, where two communities were unable to break the other, were asserting their rights. Focusing on the rights of the Holy Roman Emperor, it becomes apparent that the Emperor had sought to create with some cohesion a group of people bound to him in loyalty. Thus, the bishop-elect receives the regalia from the king, even if the latter promises “canonical elections and free consecration.” Thus, two communities are appearing in this document forms: the Holy Roman Empire, with ties to an emperor, and local communities, which retain the ability to elect their bishops. Frederick II, for all his troubles, retained sufficient authority and loyalty to raise armies.[9] Thus, the Imperial office did not lose loyalties in this contest (and in fact created new ones).
Thus, the investiture contest provides evidence that Reynolds’ view that contest divides in a way to strengthen communal bonds is a particularly shrewd and correct observation.
[1] Intended here in the wider sense of the term, as the adjective of community.
[2] Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 2nd Ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.7-8.
[3] For the criticism, see Dominique Barthélémy, The Knight, the Serf and the Historian (Ithaca: Cornell University Press): his main criticism of Duby is the enlargement of the study of the Macônais to the whole of Europe. While on the surface this appears coherent, after Reynold’s work, the historian should reconsider his position, and admit that there are interregional processes, though we must still account for the fact that these took place at different times, and, as a consequence, causality is dependent on context. Still the processes take the same shape.
[4] The primary documents are taken from Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1988), chapter 2. When noted otherwise, they come from class handouts.
[5] It is also worth noting that the large fairs of Champagne were not placed in a strategic location for long –distance trade, even if they eventually became hubs of international trade in the late-twelfth, early-thirteenth century.
[6] Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms, pp.155-158. The implicit reasoning is based on Braudel’s capitalism surveys, which consider that the city requires markets to supply it. That is, because town-folks often specialized their activities away from basic sustenance, there was a necessity for outsourcing basic needs. This duty fell on peasants. As towns grow, Braudel argues, so does the supply zone. Fernand Braudel,Les Structures du Quotidien (Paris: Armand Colin, 1979), see esp. chapter 1. Susan Reynolds uses this argument, Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms, esp. pp. 158-165.
[7] Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms, especially chapter 3, pp. 184-198. The main argument is that guilds, even if they become economic entities, initially began as common ‘interest groups’,’ which would take over some administrative duties (at times acting as electoral structures), or religious festivals (which cannot be dissociated from political life).
[8] I will focus primarily on the evidence from the Empire.
[9] Susan Reynolds, Kingdoms, p.295.
